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Abstract 
Based on anticipatory looking and reactions to violations of expected events, infants have 
been credited with ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) knowledge that a person’s search behaviour for an 
object will be guided by true or false beliefs about the object’s location. However, little is 
known about the preconditions for looking patterns consistent with belief attribution in 
infants.  In this study, we compared the performance of 17 to 26-month-olds on anticipatory 
looking in ToM tasks. The infants were either hearing or were deaf from hearing families and 
thus delayed in communicative experience gained from access to language and 
conversational input. Hearing infants significantly outperformed their deaf counterparts in 
anticipating the search actions of a cartoon character that held a false belief about a target-
object location. By contrast, the performance of the two groups in a true belief condition did 
not differ significantly. These findings suggest for the first time that access to language and 
conversational input contributes to early ToM reasoning. 
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Belief attribution in deaf and hearing infants 
The possession of a theory of mind (ToM) permits us to reason about the mental 
states of others – their beliefs, desires, and intentions – and to understand and anticipate how 
these differ from our own and from reality. A lack of ToM would be a formidable obstacle to 
all sophisticated forms of human social interaction. One proposal is that the core of ToM 
understanding is present in human infancy as a prerequisite to cultural learning (Leslie, 
Friedman, & German, 2004; Sperber & Wilson, 2002). Thus in recent years, there have been 
investigations designed to establish the extent to which preverbal infants demonstrate a 
pattern of visual attention indicative of possession of a ToM. These concern the 
understanding that a person with a false belief about the location of an object will search 
incorrectly for the object.  
In their seminal study, Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) examined infants’ performance 
on nonverbal looking tasks designed to assess their differential attention to situations in 
which a false belief has been created in a person who has not been party to a deception. In 
these experiments, even 15-month-olds displayed patterns of attention consistent with the 
accurate expectation that a person with a false belief about an object’s location will search 
unsuccessfully for the object. Perner and Ruffman (2005) have proposed that associations or 
behavioural rules that link perception and search behaviour without mind-mediated processes 
can account for these findings. Nevertheless, there is now converging evidence from various 
tasks and dependent measures that infants do indeed exhibit an incipient ability to attribute 
beliefs as indicated by their spontaneous looking-preferences (Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 
2010; Luo, 2011; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Scott, Baillargeon, Song, & Leslie, 2010; Senju, 
Southgate, Snape, Leonard, & Csibra, in press; Song & Baillargeon, 2008; Song, Onishi, 
Baillargeon, & Fisher, 2008; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 
2007; Surian & Geraci, in press) as well as by their pointing gestures and helping behaviour 
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(Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Southgate, Chevallier & Csibra, 2010). 
However, until at least the age of 4 years, children often do not succeed on false belief 
tasks involving elicited responses to verbal test questions (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  
In this respect, there is evidence that deaf children aged 4 years and above who are from 
hearing families display a protracted delay in ToM reasoning (Courtin & Melot, 2005; 
Figueras-Costa & Harris, 2001; Morgan & Kegl, 2006; Pyers & Senghas, 2009; Peterson & 
Siegal, 1995, 1999, 2000; Woolfe, Want, & Siegal, 2002) – a delay that does not extend to 
other areas of their cognitive development and that does not affect deaf children from deaf 
families who are exposed to a signed language from birth and have had continual access to 
this language environment (Meristo et al., 2007; Siegal & Peterson,  2008; Woolfe et al., 
2002).  
In typically developing children, language development (Milligan, Astington, & 
Dack, 2007; Schick, de Villiers, de Villiers,  & Hoffmeister, 2007) and participation in 
conversations about mental states such as beliefs (Brown, Donelan-McCall, & Dunn, 1996; 
Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002; Slaughter, Peterson, & Mackintosh, 2007) has been seen to 
facilitate ToM reasoning as shown on ‘elicited-response’ tasks such the Sally-Anne task used 
by Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985). According to Perner and Ruffman (2005), this 
process critically involves enculturation in a language community that would exclude most 
deaf children from hearing families because of barriers to natural communication. By this 
account, performance on ToM tasks in deaf children is delayed by their reduced access to 
language and communicative experience about mental states.  
Nevertheless, ToM in typically developing hearing children has also been linked to 
family conversational input about mental states during infancy even before expressive 
language is acquired (Meins, Fernyhough, Wainwright, Gupta, Fradley, & Tuckey, 2002). 
Indeed, although hearing mothers’ sign language proficiency and use of mental state 
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language is associated with performance on response-eliciting ToM tasks in deaf children 
aged 4 to 10 years (Moeller & Schick, 2006), hearing mothers of deaf 2- and 3-year-olds still 
communicate primarily through speech to which the children do not often attend (Lederberg 
& Everhart, 1998). Moreover, most hearing parents do not have sufficient proficiency in 
gestural communication and sign language to optimize social interactions with deaf children, 
and to converse freely about unobservable referents such as others’ beliefs (Spencer & 
Harris, 2006; Vaccari & Marschark, 1997).  
Consequently, a lack of access to language that allows conversational input and 
communication about others’ beliefs may impair performance on ToM tasks even in infancy. 
In the investigation described here, we employed eyetracking technology to reveal the extent 
to which deaf and hearing infants display anticipatory looking indicative of ToM reasoning in 
terms of the ability to attribute beliefs as representational states that are congruent or 
incongruent with reality. 
Method 
Participants. These were 10 hearing infants (4 female) and 10 deaf children (6 
female) from southern Sweden, all of whom had hearing parents. The mean age of the 
hearing group was 23 months (range: 19 to 28 months). The deaf infants had a mean age of 
23 months (range: 17 to 26 months).  As in previous research (Meristo et al., 2007), the deaf 
participants were healthy and without known additional disabilities such as cerebral palsy, 
autism, mental retardation, or visual impairment.  
In the group of deaf infants, five used cochlear implants (CI) and five hearing 
amplifications (HA). The CI children had pre-implant hearing levels in the range of 65 to 120 
dB hearing loss. The mean age of implantation was 14 months (range: 12 – 19 months) and 
the mean time since implantation was 7 months (range: 1 – 12 months). The HA children had 
hearing levels in the moderately to severely deaf range (between 50 and 80 dB hearing loss). 
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The mean age of amplification was 12 months (range: 3 – 26 months) and the mean time 
since first use of HA was 14 months (range: 1 – 21 months). The deaf infants had hearing 
parents who had gained some acquaintance with Swedish Sign Language (SSL) and 
communicated with the infants in spoken Swedish supported with signs. However, none of 
the deaf infants showed proficiency in SSL as measured by an SSL adaptation of the 
MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventories for British Sign Language 
(Woolfe, Herman, Roy, & Woll, 2010). In the deaf group, two infants had two older siblings 
aged 4 to 7 years. In the hearing group, three infants each had one older sibling aged 5 to 13 
years.   One infant in each group had a 2-month-old younger sibling. Five other infants were 
initially tested and excluded because of fussiness during the experiment (1 deaf and 4 hearing 
children).  
Procedure. The Regional Swedish Government Ethical Review Board approved the 
study. Participating families were contacted through organizations for deaf/hearing impaired 
children and hospitals. The parents were informed about the purpose and procedure of the 
study and gave signed consent. All infants participated at home and were given a small gift 
after the testing sessions (approximately $10 U.S.).  
The infants took part in two sessions separated by an interval of 1-7 days. Gaze was 
measured with a Tobii T120 (Tobii Technology, Sweden) near infrared eye tracker. Each 
infant was seated on a parent’s lap and viewed a 17-inch monitor placed 50–70 cm away. 
None of the parents communicated with the infants during testing. In each session, before the 
test trial, the infants were first given a standard 5-point calibration procedure represented by 
animated bouncing toys. Calibration was followed by presentation of two familiarization 
trials and one test trial interleaved with brief animations designed to orient the infants’ 
attention to the screen.  
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The infants then were given cat and mouse (“Tom & Jerry”) animation clips similar to 
those employed in an earlier study by Surian and Geraci (in press). In two familiarization 
trials, Tom followed Jerry through a Y-shaped tube with the two exit points. When Jerry hid 
in one of two boxes located outside the exit points, Tom sought to find Jerry in the 
appropriate box. The purpose of the familiarizations was to convey that Tom was chasing 
Jerry through the tube and looking for him in one of the boxes. In one familiarization trial, 
Jerry hid in the left box and in the other he hid in the right box. The order was 
counterbalanced across children in each group. Since two children in each group did not 
anticipate the correct side of Tom’s appearance on the second familiarization trial, statistical 
analyses on TB and FB looking were carried out both with and without these children.  
In the first session, half of the infants in each group received a true-belief (TB) test 
trial (Figure 1a and supplementary material). Here Jerry was shown moving through a Y-
shaped tube and hiding in a box corresponding to his exit point. He then moved to a second 
box located opposite the first one in full view of Tom who had momentarily left the screen 
but had reappeared to witness the second hiding location. Once Jerry disappeared into the 
second box, Tom entered the tube. The other half of the infants in each group received a 
false-belief (FB) test trial (Figure 1b and supplementary material). The procedure was the 
same except that, in the FB scenario, Tom had left the screen during the time that Jerry 
travelled into the second box and so Tom had a false belief about where Jerry was hiding. In 
the second session, infants who had received a TB test trial now received a FB trial and vice 
versa. The orders of the two conditions and the hiding place (right vs. left box) were 
counterbalanced across participants in each group. 
------------------------------------ 
       Figures 1a and 1b about here 
------------------------------------- 
Belief attribution in deaf and hearing infants 8 
Results 
For our dependent measure, we coded total looking times at the two areas of interest 
(AOIs) created to cover each of the two exit points of the tunnel as depicted in Figure 2. For 
each infant we then calculated the proportion of the time looking at correct vs. incorrect AOIs 
by dividing the total looking time inside each of the AOIs by the total time (2700 
milliseconds) that Tom travelled invisibly through the tunnel in search of the box that 
contained Jerry.   
 ------------------------- 
         Figure 2 about here 
------------------------- 
Anticipatory looking scores are shown in Figure 3. Scores in the TB condition were 
analyzed using a two-way ANOVA with group (deaf vs. hearing) as a between-subject factor 
and location (correct vs. incorrect) as within-subject factors. There were no significant main 
effects for group, F(1, 18) = 2.07, p = .168, ηp2 = .10  and no significant location X group 
interaction effect, F(1, 18) = .28, p = .605, ηp2 = .02. However, the main effect for location 
was significant with infants looking significantly longer at the correct, belief congruent 
location (i.e., Jerry’s real location), F(1, 18) = 9.48, p = .006, ηp2 = .35.  
The accurate looking pattern of the hearing infants extended to the FB condition. For 
this group, a 2 (condition: TB vs. FB) X 2 (location: correct vs. incorrect) ANOVA yielded 
no significant main effect for condition, F(1, 9) = .10, p = .765, ηp2 = .01 or interaction 
effects, F(1, 9) = .02, p = .892, ηp2 = 01,  but again only a main effect for location, F(1, 9) = 
16.59, p = .003, ηp2 = .65.  
However, in the FB condition, none of the deaf infants attended to the belief congruent 
location, i.e. to the empty box. Given the lack of variance in the responses on the deaf infants, 
we chose to use nonparametric tests rather than ANOVA techniques to test for differences. 
The deaf infants incorrectly anticipated instead that Tom would look for Jerry in his real 
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location rather than in the believed location, z = -2.67, p =  .008, η2 = .71. In contrast to the 
deaf infants, hearing infants in the FB condition looked far longer to the correct AOI, z = 
4.04, p =  .001, η2 = .82 and devoted significantly less time to the incorrect AOI, t(18) = -
3.52, p = .002, η2 = .41. All effects remained significant when excluding the two children in 
each group who did not succeed on the second familiarization trial1. There were no 
significant presentation order effects on looking times and, with one exception, no significant 
relationships between looking times and the length of interval between testing sessions2.   
------------------------- 
         Figure 3 about here 
------------------------- 
In both the deaf and hearing groups, 8 out of 10 infants looked first at the correct 
location in the TB condition. By contrast, all of 10 of the hearing infants – but none of the 10 
deaf infants – looked first at the correct location in the FB condition. The difference between 
the groups was significant (Fisher test, p < .001).  Whereas hearing infants’ performance in 
the two conditions did not differ significantly, a McNemar test indicated that the change in 
performance was significant (p = .008, two-tailed) for the 8 deaf infants who looked first at 
the correct location in the TB condition and at the incorrect location in the FB condition.      
We also examined responses on a number of measures to determine whether there were 
differences more generally between the deaf and hearing infants in the mean times to first 
fixation, numbers and duration of fixations within the AOIs, and looking time after the Jerry 
emerged from the tube in the TB and FB conditions. A series of 2 (group) X 2 (condition) 
ANOVAs yielded no significant main or interaction effects (see Table 1). Thus overall the 
deaf and hearing infants showed equivalent patterns of attention to the situations.  
 ------------------------------------ 
     Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
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Discussion 
Typically developing infants in the first year of life can attribute motivational and 
reality-congruent informational states to agents. They grasp motivational states that concern 
an agent’s desires and goals and can track what objects an agent can or cannot see. Using this 
information to interpret an agent’s behaviour, they succeed on spontaneous looking tasks in 
which an agent holds a true belief or is in a state of ignorance. A growing number of 
experimental studies (e.g., Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010) indicate that, at least by the 
second year of life, infants can also attribute reality-incongruent informational states to an 
agent and use such attributions to reason about that agent’s past or future actions. Typically 
developing hearing children aged 3 years and under often do not perform well on elicited-
response false belief tasks as these require substantial language comprehension and pragmatic 
understanding (Bloom & German, 2000; Siegal & Beattie, 1991; Surian & Leslie, 1999; 
Yazdi, German, Defeyter, & Siegal, 2006).  Moreover, elicited-response tasks require the 
development of selective attention and inhibitory processes that are underpinned by brain 
maturation (Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009). 
Findings for deaf infants and children are in sharp contrast to those for typically 
developing hearing counterparts. Not only do deaf children from hearing families aged 4 
years and older often show protracted delays on response-eliciting false belief tasks (Meristo 
et al., 2007; Siegal & Peterson, 2008) but, as shown for the first time in the present 
investigation, deaf infants who are tested on an implicit and non-verbal anticipatory looking 
measure also display impairment in their responses to actions when the agent’s search actions 
are guided by a false belief. Bearing in mind the limitation that deaf infants from deaf 
families were not included in our study, we suggest that hearing infants who pass this test 
have experienced a qualitatively different communicative input during the first two years of 
life. In typical development, the data structures required to encode and attribute false 
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representations of reality are triggered, practiced and automatized through communicative 
experience that builds upon the child’s gestures and pointing (Slaughter, Peterson, & 
Carpenter, 2009). By comparison, communication between deaf infants and hearing parents 
can be significantly impoverished (Spencer & Harris, 2006; Vaccari & Marschark, 1997) and, 
unlike hearing infants (Akhtar, 2005), deaf infants cannot easily learn from overhearing 
conversations.  An issue for further research concerns the extent to which the early 
communicative experience that appears to advantage hearing infants in belief attribution can 
be characterised in terms of mental state language and joint attentional processes. 
An alternative interpretation of our results is that, in our test situation, deaf infants do 
not know when agents are attempting to communicate; they might even assume that, when 
the mouse hides in the box, he then calls out to the cat to signal where he should be found.  
However, deaf infants and children focus on the mouth and facial expression in 
communication. Yet in our situation, the agents’ mouths are small and completely still when 
visible.  For the alternative interpretation to be viable, it would have to be proposed that all of 
the deaf children believed that, when Jerry is hidden, he suddenly uses his mouth to call out 
to Tom and that Tom receives this information even though there is no facial or mouth 
reaction whatsoever shown by either agent that would serve to ‘update’ information about 
Jerry’s location. Or put another way, rather than hiding from the cat as is usual, the mouse is 
telling the cat where he can be found. At the same time, the hearing infants would need to 
assume that no signalling had taken place to show understanding that the cat would search in 
the believed location.  Unless the underlying basis for difficulties in the performance of deaf 
children from hearing families on elicited-response ToM tasks (e.g., Morgan & Kegl, 2006; 
Woolfe et al., 2002) differs radically from that on spontaneous versions, it would need to be 
further assumed that a hidden object is communicating its identity to the agent in these 
situations as well.  In either case, this scenario is highly implausible. 
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Another issue concerns whether the early access to language of hearing infants serves 
to convey the knowledge that others are repositories of mental states such as false beliefs or 
to enhance executive functioning abilities that permit correct selection of the appropriate 
looking response that the cat will initially search for the mouse in the wrong box. 
Although for hearing children the relationship of executive functioning abilities to 
performance on elicited-response ToM tasks is well documented (Leslie, German, & Pollizzi, 
2005; Hughes, 1998; Hughes & Ensor, 2007; Pellicano, 2010; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, 
& Lee, 2006), there appears to be no close relationship between performance on executive 
functioning tasks and ToM tasks in deaf children (Meristo & Hjelmquist, 2009; Woolfe et al., 
2002), and deaf children from hearing families are not specifically impaired compared to 
hearing children on the executive measures employed to date.  Research is required to 
examine this issue further in terms of deaf children’s performance on both elicited-response 
and spontaneous tasks.  A related issue that merits further research concerns the use of 
‘curse-of-knowledge’ strategies in which children’s performance in judging the actions of a 
naïve agent is biased by their own knowledge (Birch & Bloom, 2003). 
In a study involving a violation of expectations rather than anticipatory looking, 
Kovács et al. (2010) has reported results suggesting that hearing 7-month-olds have a grasp 
of belief attribution. At this age, it may be thought that infants are too young to benefit from 
mental state language. However, such findings can be seen as consistent with data suggesting 
that mental state talk even at 6 months of age predicts future ToM performance on verbal 
tasks (Meins et al., 2002).  We do not maintain that hearing infants have a grasp of the 
meaning of terms for mental states but that, even at a very early age, they can benefit from 
the pragmatic context of verbal and gestural communication in joint attention when these 
terms are employed.  Although differences in performance on violation of expectation and 
anticipatory looking tasks remain to be examined, at least in the latter case even a small 
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amount of mental state talk both direct and incidentally during infancy, with accompanying 
joint attention, may suffice. This sort of early communicative experience is abundantly 
available for hearing infants and deaf infants of deaf parents but is drastically reduced for 
deaf infants from hearing families. We suggest that the process of protracted delay in the 
ToM performance of deaf infants and children may be similar to delays observed when there 
is visual, rather than auditory, deprivation during infancy in that infants with cataracts that 
are removed at the age of a year display protracted difficulties in recognising faces (Le 
Grand, Mondloch, Mauer, & Brandt, 2001). 
Deafness provides vital insights into the linguistic and cultural bases of development 
(Corina & Singleton, 2009). In our study, the consequences of drastically reduced language 
input for social-cognitive development emerge even for preverbal deaf infants in terms of a 
pattern of early visual attention that mirrors protracted delays in the expression of ToM 
reasoning on verbal tests. These effects can be seen as similar to atypical language 
development in that deaf individuals with little language experience in early life display not 
only protracted delays but qualitatively different ways of processing language (Mayberry, 
Lock, & Kazmi, 2002).  
What are the consequences of very limited access to conversations about mental states 
and ensuing atypical ToM for later development? Deaf children and young adults from 
hearing families have difficulties in expressing anger and are greatly over-represented in 
mental health settings, with a major part of this outcome seen as stemming from difficulties 
in understanding others’ minds (Hindley, 2005; Hindley, Hill, McGuigan, & Kitson, 1994; 
Rieffe & Meerum Terwogt, 2006). In this regard, our findings underscore the need for 
intervention to facilitate early communicative experience and the emergence of core ToM 
knowledge. 
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Footnote 
1
 Excluding the two children in each group who did not succeed on the second 
familiarization trial, anticipatory looking scores for the TB condition were analyzed using a 
two-way ANOVA with group (deaf vs. hearing) as a between-subject factor and location 
(correct vs. incorrect) as within-subject factors. There were no significant main effects for 
group. F(1, 14) = 1.80, p = .201, ηp2 = .11  and no significant location X group interaction 
effect, : F(1, 14) = .97, p = .341, ηp2 = .07. However, the main effect for location was 
significant with infants looking significantly longer in correctly anticipating that Tom with 
his true belief would search for Jerry in his real location, F(1, 14) = 7.73, p = .015, ηp2 = .36. 
The accurate looking pattern of the hearing infants extended to the FB condition. For this 
group, a 2 (condition: TB vs. FB) X 2 (location: correct vs. incorrect) ANOVA yielded no 
significant main effect for condition, F(1, 7) = .32, p = .592, ηp2 = .04, or interaction effect, 
F(1, 7) = .01, p = .966, ηp2 = .001, but again only a main effect for location, F(1, 7) = 14.29, p 
= .007, ηp2 = .67.   However, in the FB condition, the deaf infants incorrectly anticipated 
instead that Tom would look for Jerry in his real location, z = -2.52, p =  .012, η2 = .79. 
Compared to the deaf, hearing infants looked far longer at the correct location, z = 3.59, p =  
.001, η2 = .81 and looked significantly less at the incorrect location, t(14) = -3.85, p = .002, η2 
= .51. 
2 For the hearing infants only, looking time at the incorrect AOI was correlated 
significantly with length of delay, r(9) = 0.77, p < .009.  All other correlations between  
looking time at the correct and incorrect AOIs in the TB and FB conditions for the two 
groups were not significant (all p’s > 0.10).   
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Figure 1. Sequence of key frames shown to deaf and hearing infants in the (a) true belief  
 
and (b) false belief conditions in Experiment 1 (see also supplementary material). 
 
(a) True belief condition 
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(b) False belief condition 
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Figure 2. Areas of interest (AOIs) indicated in red used to score eye movements 
corresponding to knowledge of Tom possessing a true or false belief about Jerry’s 
location. 
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Figure 3. Mean proportions of total looking time within the correct and incorrect areas of 
interest for each group and condition. 
 
 
Table 1. Means (with standard deviations in parentheses) for measures of attention to the TB and FB scenarios:   
  
  
  
  
  
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Fixations were predefined with Tobii Studio fixation filter as movements less than 0.42 pixels/ms. 
 
 Deaf children Hearing children F-ratios (dfs, 1,18), p’s > 0.06, η2 < .13 
Measures TB FB TB FB Group Condition Group X Condition 
Duration of fixation 
 
0.45 (0.20) 
 
0.55 (0.23) 0.46 (0.19) 0.65 (0.42) 0.41 2.73 0.25 
 
Number of fixations 
 
2.1 (0.99) 2.4 (1.42) 2.8 (1.40) 2.8 (1.87) 1.08 0.16 0.16 
Time to first fixation 1.14 (0.57) 0.88 (0.47) 0.72 (0.46) 0.75 (0.42) 3.55 0.50 0.78 
Looking time when cat 
reemerges (max = 1 sec) 
 
0.87 (0.19) 0.76 (0.27) 0.89 (0.10) 0.80 (0.25) 0.16 2.56 0.41 
 
